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Slavoj ÎiÏek is irrepressible. He continues to produce at least two books a
year in English and may well have just published what will become his mag-
num opus, The Parallax View (MIT Press, 2006). The secondary literature
on ÎiÏek has also now begun to emerge at an astonishing rate. As I was
reading for this review, another monograph appeared, Jodi Dean’s ÎiÏek’s
Politics (Routledge, 2006), and at least two more volumes of critical essays
are in press to my knowledge. This is not to mention the launch of an inter-
national journal of ÎiÏek studies and the release of a documentary ÎiÏek!
(Astra Taylor, 2005), which, with no apparent sense of irony, gives ÎiÏek the
full rock star treatment. If there is a thread that draws together these intro-
ductions, including Dean’s monograph that I will not discuss further here,
and the volume of critical essays, with the exception of Ian Parker’s book,
it is that ÎiÏek’s extraordinarily seductive synthesis of Lacanianism,
Hegelianism and Marxism - filtered through the lens of popular culture - is
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pressed into the service of a coherent and consistent political project. As
Sarah Kay puts it on the opening page of her introduction, “At the core of
ÎiÏek’s work is a vigorous reactivation of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the
service of a project at once political and philosophical” (1). It is also this
very question of ÎiÏek’s politics that all the critics under review (with the
exception of Tony Myers) find most problematic about his work and there-
fore I will focus upon this thread in my own assessment.
ÎiÏek - sui generis
Myers’s volume for the Routledge Critical Thinkers series is aimed ex-
plicitly at the undergraduate market and provides a first step into the work
of the particular theorist rather than an exhaustive study. The RCT volumes
all have the same format, with a “why study this thinker?” introduction fol-
lowed by a series of chapters on “Key Ideas.” Myers’s book addresses
ÎiÏek’s influences (Hegel, Marx and Lacan), the notion of the subject, post-
modernity, ideology, sexual difference and fantasy. In such a restricted
format as this, one can always find areas that one thinks should have been
included or expanded and other areas that should have been dropped. For
example, ÎiÏek is presented here as some kind of postmodern thinker
drawing on the work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, whereas he is
extremely critical of the work of both and has spent an inordinate amount of
time writing against the notion of postmodernity. If ÎiÏek draws anything
from the present “postmodern” conjuncture, it is the idea of cynical reason,
but this is mentioned only in passing in the chapter on postmodernism. In
saying this, however, one needs to read these volumes in the light of their
intended market and Myers covers most of his chosen ground fluently and
accessibly, introducing such difficult concepts as Hegel’s notion of the sub-
ject as the “night of the world” and Lacan’s theory of sexuation. 
The RCT volumes include a section of further reading which students
can follow up if interested. Myers rather disappointingly only includes
ÎiÏek’s own work in this section and none of the critical material that was
available at the time of publication. There is something symptomatic about
this concerning the reception of ÎiÏek in the Anglo-American academy and
the way his work is now being deployed. ÎiÏek tends to be read (and here
Parker is the exception again) in a very decontextualized way; he is read on-
ly insofar as he engages with the present concerns of US and Western Euro-
pean intellectuals, for example, his interest in US popular culture or his
polemics against identity politics. In terms of his own intellectual formation
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and politics, critics take ÎiÏek at his own word and, more detrimentally, as
the final word on the recent politics of Eastern Europe. Myers repeats these
errors, especially the personalizing and individualizing of what is always
fundamentally a collective history. Thus we read about ÎiÏek’s failure to get
an academic job in the early 1970s because “the authorities were concerned
that the charismatic teaching of ÎiÏek might improperly influence students
with his dissident thinking” (7). It was certainly the case that ÎiÏek did not
get an academic job in the early 70s, but many other intellectuals, artists,
film-makers and academics also did not get jobs or lost their positions and
had to leave Yugoslavia following the clampdown after the Croatian Spring
of 1971. ÎiÏek was part of a student and intellectual movement in the late
60s that challenged the very foundations of the federal republic with calls
for greater democracy and liberalization, and the state backlash against this
movement would sow the seeds for the subsequent conflicts and wars of
succession in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 90s. 
Does this matter? Only if we are interested in ÎiÏek’s politics as a form
of “praxis” (Myers’s choice of word) and not just as a theoretical and philo-
sophical intervention. If, as Kay argues, the impetus behind ÎiÏek’s writing
is political, in the sense that he wants to make the world a better place, then
it is important to understand where these politics went wrong. That is to say,
it is important to understand how the student and new social movements in
Yugoslavia in the 1970s degenerated into the virulent nationalisms of the
1980s and the subsequent extreme rightwing politics that dominate so much
of the former Yugoslav space today. Parker’s is the only introduction cur-
rently under review that begins this process of locating ÎiÏek’s work in its
historical and social context and from which the contours of ÎiÏek’s politics
emerge more clearly. It is, at best, insufficient to criticize unreconstructed
Marxists like Teresa Ebert and myself for being critical of ÎiÏek’s politics
because of “the personal difficulties [ÎiÏek] has incurred as the result of his
political stand in Slovenia (which, he has pointed out, cost him most of his
friends, destroyed his intellectual profile there and caused him to be incor-
rectly vilified as a nationalist abroad)” (Myers 122). At worst, this repro-
duces the most reactionary aspects of capitalist ideology that seeks to reduce
political activity to individualism and heroic acts of defiance. If there is a
politics to ÎiÏek’s work, then let us at least do him the justice of taking it se-
riously. This means interrogating the sources of that politics, not just
Althusser but also, for instance, Gyorgy Konrad’s conception of “antipoli-
tics” that influenced so much of the late 70s punk scene in Yugoslavia, and
how it played out in practice. How, for example, could a pacifist journalist
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writing for Mladina, the youth journal with which ÎiÏek was associated,
who was imprisoned for writing against the militarism of the Yugoslav state,
become the first defense minister in the newly independent Slovene state,
arguing for the necessity of a strong Slovene military force, and then subse-
quently become the leader of a far right nationalist party? These seem to me
to be important questions to ask about the implications of ÎiÏek’s politics.
Surely the time has come in “ÎiÏek studies,” if such a thing is desirable
(which I doubt) to stop personalizing all these narratives and see intellectu-
al labor as also a collective project. 
This is the area where Myers is weakest. The reading of Marx here is
superficial, with Althusser’s definition of ideology being attributed directly
to ÎiÏek (20). ÎiÏek’s contribution to a Marxian understanding of ideology
has been the structuring role of fantasy, not the idea that it works through
the subject. On the basis of this introduction, one would think that radical
politics began with ÎiÏek. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of reading
ÎiÏek sui generis is to be found at the end of Kay’s book in the “Glossary
of ÎiÏekian Terms.” All of these terms (with the exception of two from
Hegel) are Lacanian terms. We can also see this tendency in Matthew
Sharpe’s book, which attributes Lacan’s insight into the function of lan-
guage and the big Other directly to ÎiÏek (61); he also presents the psycho-
analytic understanding of original fantasy (as a fantasy of origins) as if it
were ÎiÏek’s own contribution (154).1 ÎiÏek is sometimes careless in ac-
knowledging his sources, and it would be helpful if his expositors were
more careful in this respect. ÎiÏek is a brilliant reader of Hegel and Lacan,
but he is not an original thinker like Lacan, who formulated his own termi-
nology, or Hegel, who developed his own philosophical system. He has cre-
ated a startling hybrid of Hegelianism and Lacanese, but the terms and con-
cepts he deploys remain largely Lacan’s. What is now coming increasingly
under scrutiny is the precise nature of ÎiÏek’s relationship to contemporary
Lacanianism.
In Traversing the Fantasy, both Yannis Stavrakakis and Russell Grigg
highlight the problematic nature of ÎiÏek’s relationship to Lacan through
his conception of the act. Both agree that this is based on a misreading
of Sophocles’s play Antigone and Lacan’s subsequent seminar on ethics.
Stravrakakis and Grigg argue that ÎiÏek’s notion of the act increasingly re-
veals ÎiÏek’s distance from “orthodox” Lacanianism, as Lacan himself re-
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1. See in this respect Laplanche and Pontalis’s seminal essay “Fantasy and the Origins
of Sexuality.” 
placed the notion of an ethics of desire, from Seminar VII onwards, with the
ethics of the drive. ÎiÏek’s response to this is that he knows full well the lat-
er texts of Lacan, but this does not change his view of the act. From an “or-
thodox” Lacanian perspective this is a completely contradictory position to
hold. Geoff Boucher’s contribution to Traversing the Fantasy suggests that
many of the theoretical dilemmas in ÎiÏek’s work derive from a misreading
of Lacan’s “graph of desire,” going all the way back to The Sublime Object of
Ideology itself. Again ÎiÏek’s response to these criticisms in his reply, “Con-
cesso non Dato,” at the end of the volume is that Boucher is reading Lacan in-
correctly and not him. What is clear from these exchanges, however, is that al-
though ÎiÏek has probably done more than any other theorist in recent years
to reorient our reading of Lacan from the earlier “structuralist” texts to the late
Lacan and his emphasis on the real, the influence of ÎiÏek’s Lacan within the
academy, as well as the Lacanians’ Lacan, is now a highly contested terrain.
Indeed, as Kay points out, while ÎiÏek is often viewed as the great popular-
izer of Lacanian psychoanalysis, through such early texts as Looking Awry:
An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (1991) and En-
joy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (1992), he actual-
ly returns to a very limited number of reference points and seminars out of
Lacan’s total oeuvre. As Stavrakakis, Grigg, Boucher and Parker all argue,
it would be a mistake to start reading ÎiÏek in place of Lacan.
The Politics of the Act
Kay’s introduction is a much more thorough and rigorous study, and her
elucidation of the influence of German idealism on ÎiÏek’s thinking is by far
the best of any of the introductions under consideration. Kay reads ÎiÏek’s
proliferation of texts and constant return to the same themes and intellectu-
al antagonists as a continual process of self-clarification and self-correction.
So, for example, ÎiÏek’s long running exchange with Judith Butler has fa-
cilitated a refinement of the notions of castration and the fundamental fan-
tasy, and his more recent endorsement of the work of Alain Badiou has al-
lowed him once again to clarify what he means by the political “act.” The
problem with reading ÎiÏek this way is that it suggests a more coherent and
consistent project than is perhaps the case. It suggests, for example, that be-
hind all the jokes and digressions there is a coherent theoretical system be-
ing elaborated, if only one reads carefully enough. Parker is right, I think, to
argue that this is a fundamental misreading of ÎiÏek (114-15), a misreading
that most of us have been making for years. ÎiÏek is an intellectual provo-
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cateur and incisive critic of the ideology of advanced capitalism, but I am
not convinced that he makes a coherent analysis of the contemporary world
order or of how we might respond to that system today.
The tendency to read ÎiÏek as elaborating a consistent position also has
implications for how we read his politics. One of the constant categories of
ÎiÏek’s political writing, notes Kay, has been the notion of “the act” as “a
violent disruption of the status quo that might make it possible to puncture
the prevailing ideology and effect political change” (6). Kay’s study is at its
best when it traces such notions of the act not just to Lacan but through
Kierkegaard (the act as repetition) and Schelling (from where ÎiÏek derives
his conception of human freedom), but it also reveals the weakness of such
an approach. The category of the act is neither indexed nor used as a sub-
heading in The Sublime Object of Ideology; indeed the notion of “the act”
only began to emerge as a central concept of ÎiÏek’s political thinking from
1992 onwards.2 In both The Sublime Object of Ideology and For They Know
Not What They Do, ÎiÏek promotes the political strategies of overidentifi-
cation and traversing the fantasy. As a more explicit and radical avowal of
his position regarding Marxism emerges in the 90s, the notion of the act
takes on an ever more prominent position and the idea of traversing the fan-
tasy disappears completely. As Kay notes, however, ÎiÏek’s politics of the
act is deeply problematic; the two examples of a political act that he most
frequently uses are suicide and terror, and these are hardly useful rallying
calls for the renewal of the Left. Indeed, as Stavrakakis points out, the “trag-
ic-heroic paradigm” ÎiÏek draws out of Antigone is “completely unsuitable
as a model for transformative ethico-political action” (173). 
For Parker, the notion of the act is an index of ÎiÏek’s distance not on-
ly from Lacanianism but also from Marxism. Indeed, while Kay is critical
of ÎiÏek’s politics of the act, which results in an uncertain “balance between
desperation and responsibility” (155), she concludes her introduction with a
positive reading of ÎiÏek’s writing as exemplary of a political act (157). It
is only Parker who nails the issue: “Radical though it is, ÎiÏek’s characteri-
zation of that end-point [of analysis] in some eruption of the truth of the sub-
ject in a ‘psychoanalytic act’ is so overblown as to be useless as a model of
social change” (74). For Parker, the problems revolve around two sets of is-
sues: first, the link between femininity and violence that is frequently asso-
ciated with the act in ÎiÏek’s writing, and second, the representation of psy-
choanalysis through “[t]he imagery of utter abjection [which leaves] indi-
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vidual subjects with no way out” (80). As Parker observes, this is not a great
advertisement for psychoanalysis and also bears very little relationship to
Lacan’s own conception of the act. A politics of the act is simply the des-
peration of an ultraleftist politics that can conceive of no other way out of
the present situation.
We can all agree today, at least those of us who still like to see ourselves
on the radical and progressive side of politics, where I would locate ÎiÏek,
on the horrors and destruction of neo-liberal capitalism and the need to think
beyond the limits of the global market. The issue is not whether or not we
need “an act” to change all this but what kind of politics might emerge from
this act. It might just be that what we need today is more political activity,
of the kind that ÎiÏek stigmatizes for not challenging the horizons of the
present. Marxists would agree with ÎiÏek that there can be no blueprint for
the future - utopia for us is a radical impulse, a signifier of discontent and
dissatisfaction with the present, not a space of full presence - and we would
agree on the need to think beyond the horizon of the market. But if there is
to be a radically new vision of the future, this will come out of political ac-
tivity, not through rhetorical fiat.
Traversing the Social-Ideological Fantasy
In her analysis of the act, Kay concludes that “the earlier work on ideolo-
gy, with its prospect of traversing the political fantasy, may be more [po-
litically] effective” (155), a position I find myself increasingly in agreement
with. This is also where Sharpe takes his starting point from. Sharpe’s book
is the most restricted of the introductions under review, in the sense that he
does not seek to provide an overview of ÎiÏek’s oeuvre but rather to draw
out the strands of a coherent social theory based on what Sharpe calls
ÎiÏek’s expanded concept of ideology.3 One of Sharpe’s central criticisms
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3. Sharpe’s book is published in the Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy se-
ries which, according to the blurb on the back, “aims to bring high quality research
monograph publishing back into focus for authors.” On the evidence of this volume,
this is a rather scandalous misrepresentation of the facts; this is a Ph.D. thesis pub-
lished with little or no rewriting or proof reading. The number of typos and gram-
matical mistakes are too numerous to list and the use of italics is often a complete
mess (see 218, 224). A number of quotations from ÎiÏek and Lacan are incorrect or
contain typos (for some examples see 55, 66, 83, 190, 191, 202) and, perhaps most
extraordinarily for a Ph.D. on ÎiÏek, the title of Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?
is given incorrectly throughout, For They Know Not What They Do is incorrectly cit-
of ÎiÏek is his hesitation to actually say what he means, and the same could
be said for this book. Despite continually indicating that he will move be-
yond description of ÎiÏek’s theory to its critique, Sharpe only really gets
down to this in the final chapter. Sharpe’s thesis is that ÎiÏek is working
within the same problematic as, and a situation not dissimilar to, that of the
Frankfurt School in the 1930s, but offers us a way out of the aporias that
have dogged Western Marxism ever since. Indeed, Sharpe even goes so far
at one point as to compare ÎiÏek’s position on contemporary capitalism to
that of Marcuse in the 1960s, especially One Dimensional Man. This is an
interesting take on ÎiÏek, given his own critique of both Adorno and Mar-
cuse in The Metastases of Enjoyment (1994) and the distance he wishes to
place between his own position and that of the official Frankfurt School op-
position associated with the praxis group in the former Yugoslavia. As Kay
notes, ÎiÏek shares with Adorno a similar taste in European “high” culture
and disdain for popular culture (something his “fans” seem to have missed),
but beyond this the similarities probably end. Parker is also clear on the
difference between ÎiÏek and the Frankfurt School. Unlike the Frankfurt
School’s Hegelian reading of Freud, ÎiÏek reads Hegel and Freud from the
vantage point of Lacan and this produces an entirely different notion of the
subject (59). Adorno’s reading of Freud was thoroughly biological and one
of the virtues of Lacan’s “return to Freud” has been to restore the radicalism
of the Freudian unconscious, through the notions of desire, fantasy and the
real. One could also note that the economic situation that shaped Marcuse’s
1960s text is very different from the triumphant neo-liberalism that we face
today.
For Sharpe, ÎiÏek’s Marxist credentials are secured not so much
through his critique of critical theory as through his coupling of that critique
with an emancipatory narrative (23-24). The problem for Sharpe is that
when he comes to delineate that emancipatory narrative, he has certain
problems identifying it, as according to him, ÎiÏek does not provide us with
an economic analysis of capitalism through which we can identify today’s
working class (203). Although ÎiÏek continually invokes the need to over-
throw capitalism, he has no strategy or consistent vision for doing so (217);
ÎiÏek cannot envisage a future after capitalism, as he has no normative eth-
ical position (240). If Sharpe is correct in these assertions, then one could
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ed (126) as well as being correctly and incorrectly cited on the same page (63), Alen-
ka Zupanãiã is cited as the editor of Ethics of the Real rather than the author and An-
thony Elliott receives various spellings of his name and is not in the reference list. 
legitimately ask in what possible sense can ÎiÏek provide the way out of the
aporias of Western Marxism? We have only to look back through the histo-
ry of critical theory and Western Marxism to find detailed analyses of the
changing structure of social class, alternative strategies for challenging
capitalism and arguments around the ethical and normative assumptions
behind Marxism. If these intellectual resources are already to hand, then
why should we turn to a theory that lacks them? ÎiÏek’s contribution to
Western Marxism, it seems to me, is his Lacanianism (the constitutive role
of lack) and the fundamental role that fantasy plays in ideological forma-
tions, and it is here that Sharpe’s book is at its weakest.
Of all the books under review here, Sharpe’s is the most uneasy with
psychoanalysis and this may account for the absence of one of the key ele-
ments of ÎiÏek’s theory of ideology, the idea of the “social-ideological fan-
tasy,” which does not receive a mention at all and there is also no sustained
discussion of “lack.” Although, as mentioned above, the idea of traversing
the fantasy now seems to have fallen by the wayside, to be replaced by an
emphasis on jouissance, surplus-pleasure and enjoyment, it was the idea
of the fundamental structuring role of fantasy as the support of symbolic
reality that facilitated ÎiÏek’s resuscitation of the moribund concept of ide-
ology in the late 80s. As he famously put it in The Sublime Object of Ideol-
ogy, ideology is not simply a function of the symbolic, but the symbolic, so-
cial reality itself is inherently ideological: “the illusion is not on the side of
knowledge, it is already on the side of reality itself, of what people are do-
ing. What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their activity, is
guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion” (32). Ideology, therefore, is
not an illusion masking the true state of things (false consciousness) but so-
cial reality itself is ideological through and through, and it is fantasy that
sustains our relationship to an inherently conflictual and antagonistic reali-
ty. The issue of fantasy arises just over half way through Sharpe’s book, but
this is in relation to the subject of fantasy, and the relationship between fan-
tasy and ideology is never adequately addressed. This is surely a missed op-
portunity, as much of ÎiÏek’s best work, and where his ideas have their
strongest purchase, is in the analysis of the fantasy structures of advanced
capitalism. 
Arrested Dialectics
According to Sharpe, the overriding problem with ÎiÏek’s social theory is
its Kantianism and the priority he accords to the Kantian antinomy over and
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above a dialectical understanding of contradiction. For all of ÎiÏek’s
avowed Hegelianism he is really a Kantian at heart and the whole critique
of contemporary capitalism collapses into the stasis of the Kantian antino-
mies. At the end of the day ÎiÏek’s social theory is too metaphysical, as he
turns to philosophy and psychoanalysis to ground his political theory; in
short, “ÎiÏek wants to ‘save the revolution with an ontology’” (215). One
can almost hear ÎiÏek’s response, as one reads these pages: “Did I not write
a book entitled Tarrying with the Negative?” “Have I not argued from The
Sublime Object onwards that antagonism is constitutive?” “Has not my
whole endeavor been to rescue the Hegelian dialectic, the labor of the nega-
tive, from the misrepresentations of post-structuralism and deconstruction?”
Helpfully for us, Sharpe includes this chapter as his contribution to Travers-
ing the Fantasy and we do not need to speculate on ÎiÏek’s response. In his
reply to Sharpe, ÎiÏek argues that Hegel radicalizes the Kantian antinomy
in the sense that “the final Hegelian reversal is rather a redoubling of the an-
tinomic gap, its displacement into the ‘thing itself’” (“Concesso non Dato”
244). Thus “it is Hegel who ‘deontologises’ Kant, introducing a gap into the
very texture of reality” (244). Second, Sharpe takes his suggestions con-
cerning the antinomy and contradiction from Jameson’s The Seeds of Time
(1994) but, as ÎiÏek notes, it is precisely Jameson’s point that “today’s con-
crete social reality is antinomic in the sense that it does not allow us to de-
lineate a clear project of the dissolution of its antagonisms” (245). Or, as
Jameson himself puts it, “The age is clearly enough more propitious for the
antinomy than the contradiction” (2). For Jameson, as for ÎiÏek, there is no
simple distinction between the Kantian antinomy and dialectical contradic-
tion. Indeed,
rather than positing a situation in which we have to choose between
these two categories . . . it might be worthwhile using them concur-
rently and against one other, insofar as each is uniquely equipped to
problematize the other in its most vital implications. The pair do not
themselves form an opposition . . . rather, they stand as each other’s bad
conscience, and as a breath of suspicion that clings to the concept itself.
To wonder whether an antinomy is not really a contradiction in dis-
guise; to harbor the nagging thought that what we took to be a contra-
diction was really little more than an antinomy - these pointed recipro-
cal doubts can do the mind no harm and may even do it some good. (4) 
The ability to think through this complex relationship between the antinomy
and the contradiction has been one of the most valuable aspects of ÎiÏek’s
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work over the past decade and a half, and it seems strange that Sharpe
should miss the target of his critique so widely in this respect.
Possibly the most incisive critique of ÎiÏek’s dialectic remains Peter
Dews’s very early piece in Radical Philosophy (1995), where he argued that
ÎiÏek’s reading of Hegel’s “spirit is a bone” is essentially one-sided. ÎiÏek
tends to stress the negation of the dialectic but not the negation of the nega-
tion. In Traversing the Fantasy Dews performs a similar exercise on ÎiÏek’s
reading of Schelling. ÎiÏek turns to Schelling, argues Dews, to address cer-
tain problems inherent in the Lacanian subject, namely that Lacan’s notion
of “being” seems to presuppose that being belongs primarily to the inertly
given. ÎiÏek highlights how the very idea of a decentred subject is not as re-
cent a discovery as we might think and can be traced all the way back to
German idealism. From this perspective he emphasizes the presence of no-
tions of the gap, separation and alienation in Schelling’s work. Dews does
not deny the presence of these motifs in Schelling’s work, but insists
that they are accompanied by “some ontological - or perhaps better: pre-
ontological - affinity between spirit and nature, subject and signifier”
(“The Eclipse of Coincidence” 203). “Schelling’s fundamental philosophi-
cal struggle,” writes Dews, “was to hold this complex vision of plenitude
and negativity, of essential conflict and potential reconciliation, together”
(207). ÎiÏek emphasizes only one side of this struggle and, for Dews at
least, this explains the underlying pessimism of ÎiÏek’s politics. Unfortu-
nately ÎiÏek does not include his response to Dews here (as he does not with
Stavrakakis), as both the article and his reply were published elsewhere.4
Traversing the Fantasy explicitly brings together critical responses to
ÎiÏek’s work, and I have already mentioned some of the stronger pieces in the
volume. Robert Pfaller gives an excellent introduction to ÎiÏek’s concept of
ideology, which is a useful antidote to Sharpe’s book, but it is not exactly crit-
ical, as ÎiÏek himself points out. Like all edited volumes, this one is uneven.
Robert Paul Resch’s contribution, “What if God Was One of Us - ÎiÏek’s On-
tology” is as bizarre a reading of Lacan as I have ever come across. To quote
just one sentence: “Because the human brain (the Lacanian RSI) is the em-
bodiment of the subject, it is impossible for this brain (RSI) to grasp its own
act of cognition and achieve full self-presence or self-consciousness” (91).
This is not a recognizable version of Lacanian psychoanalysis in any sense
that I understand it. While I am more sympathetic to Sarah Herbold’s contri-
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bution on ÎiÏek’s gendering of cultural analysis - popular culture
feminine/high culture masculine - I do think she misses her target. Like ÎiÏek,
I have never come across the “abyss of nonsignificance . . . figured as a vagi-
na” (130) in his work and feel that this is a caricature of his position. Herbold’s
is one of a number of essays here that offers us alternative readings to ÎiÏek’s
own film analysis; others include Robert Miklitsch on film noir and Ian
Buchanan on Hitchcock. While such readings are interesting in themselves,
they do not displace ÎiÏek’s own readings or take full account of what he is
doing with film and cultural analysis generally. As Kay notes, ÎiÏek is putting
culture at the service of theory and not the other way round (50), and it is here
that culture plays a crucial role as an object mediating the relationship be-
tween the subject and the real. From a Lacanian perspective, “The object acts
as a necessary screen between the subject and the real. Through the position-
ing of objects, a sense of reality is maintained” (58). Ultimately, it is the work
of culture to explore this precarious imbalance between the subject and the re-
al and preserve us from the worst excesses of the real.
The Politics of Style
Finally, let me conclude by saying something about the opening essay in
the volume, Justin Clemens’s “The Politics of Style,” as this is where the
majority of commentators locate the “truth” of ÎiÏek’s project and his poli-
tics. I have already mentioned that for Kay ÎiÏek’s style is exemplary of a
political act and for Myers his style enacts the fundamental axiom that “the
truth is always elsewhere” (6). Clemens claims that many of the dilemmas
identified by ÎiÏek’s critics, the inconsistency in his work, the cutting and
pasting from one work to another and the sheer quantity of books that he
turns out, the focus on the content of works rather than their form, the fac-
tual and interpretative errors that he makes, can all be accounted for in terms
of style. As Clemens points out, the sheer breadth of ÎiÏek’s work is only
matched by its equally compulsive repetition of the same; the repetition of
stock phrases and words, of jokes and examples and above all the repetition
of themes. What is truly distinct about ÎiÏek’s style, however, is its rapidi-
ty of change, a rapidity that seeks to match the pace of change in a post-
modern world as well as enact the development of his own thought process-
es, as he attempts to revise, rectify and clarify his positions. According to
Clemens, this rectification is usually equivocal, hence the continual re-
proach against ÎiÏek that he oscillates between positions and never clearly
says what he means. What is most interesting regarding Clemens’s argument
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here is his assertion that this equivocation is the result of ÎiÏek’s inability to
read lyric poetry: “It is not that ÎiÏek just doesn’t do such close readings;
my belief is that he absolutely cannot do so. Poetry is an object he cannot
look directly at; indeed, it appears only as an anamorphotic stain in his
texts” (16). In this sense, ÎiÏek’s work is, paradoxically, completely de-
pendent on poetry, its absent center, and constrained by the discourse of the
University. This is an interesting take on ÎiÏek’s style and Clemens is cer-
tainly right in identifying the absence of lyric poetry from his endless range
of exempla, but it is probably a mistake, I think, to try and identify one sin-
gle factor, or absence, as the source of all subsequent equivocations. This
has more to do, I believe, with the attempt to hold together such disparate
discourses and then filter them all through Lacan. As if to prove Clemens’s
point, ÎiÏek’s reply to a separate collection of critical essays currently in
press, takes its examples from lyric poetry.
Acting Out, or, Why we all Love to Hate ÎiÏek
For Parker, ÎiÏek’s style is a form of “acting out,” as opposed to an “act”:
“Acting out . . . is always staged for the Other - a display of hysterical
challenge that accuses and refuses. So, when [ÎiÏek] accuses and refuses
his readers he also does so as someone who knows something more than
ourselves about what we enjoy” (127). And that is precisely why we like
it so much. Parker’s text is the only one that really engages with ÎiÏek in
a style comparable to his object of study: polemical, digressive and polit-
ically motivated. Unlike most of ÎiÏek’s critics and expositors, Parker is
both a Marxist and a Lacanian analyst and in this sense he comes from a
similar position to ÎiÏek himself, sharing a similar concern with challeng-
ing the complacency of liberal academia and the neo-liberal economic or-
thodoxy that nothing can change. Parker’s book is also, however, the most
critical introduction under review. For instance, he is the only critic who
insists, correctly I believe, that ÎiÏek is “not a Marxist at all” (2). What we
have with ÎiÏek is only the appearance of Marxism with no substantive
content and this “is a dismal conclusion to what was supposedly to be a
radical theoretical intervention in political practice” (104). Similarly,
Parker argues that ÎiÏek is now something of a fellow traveler of Miller-
ian Stalinism but is not a radical Lacanian in the sense that Lacan himself
was.
As is most probably clear from the proceeding arguments, I find Park-
er’s introduction the best, in the sense that it is the most politically engaged,
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as well as the most effective in locating ÎiÏek’s work within its socio-
historical, as opposed to purely philosophical, context. As I have indicated,
I think there is much more work to be done here regarding the early punk
scene in the former Yugoslavia beyond Laibach and the NSK, as well as
work on the student and new social movements. Also it seems to me that any
real understanding of ÎiÏek’s politics must engage with the debates around
civil society and the state that were played out as Yugoslavia disintegrated.
It is only in this sense, through his opposition to civil society, that we can
fully grasp ÎiÏek’s self-avowed Stalinism. Parker indicates the importance
of this opposition (32-33) but does not follow it through. So let me conclude
by highlighting my differences from Parker’s position, which can be
grouped around two central issues: the representation of Yugoslav history
and the radicalism of psychoanalysis. 
Parker’s representation of Tito’s “socialist” state is one of Stalinism
with a human face; behind the façade of socialist self management and
“brotherhood and unity” we find a Stalinist regime as bad as anything in
the Soviet Union. Thus, “the signifier ‘socialism’ rested on practices that
required the absence of anything actually approaching socialism [and] . . .
evacuated of the content that Western leftists usually summon up when
they appeal to socialism” (17). While Yugoslavia was hardly an example
of socialist paradise, its function as a signifier was much more complex
than this. One might want to make comparisons with the contemporary
status of Cuba as a signifier; much of the radical left continues to support
Cuba in its struggle against US imperialism and the support it provides for
progressive regimes across Latin America, but we are not under any illu-
sions that this is socialism as we would want it. At the time, Yugoslav self-
management was an important alternative to both capitalism and Soviet
central planning; Parker is right that it proved to be disastrous for the federal
republic, but as a signifier it is important for the left that attempted to think
about alternative economic relations and not just identities. Similarly, the
formation of the non-aligned movement, of which Tito was a founder, and
the work of the praxis group, trying to retrieve Marxist theory from the
dogma of Stalinist orthodoxy, were important moments in the history of
anti-colonialist struggle and the development of Western Marxism respec-
tively. 
The second area where I differ from Parker is in his reading of psycho-
analytic politics. For Parker, Lacan is a revolutionary; I disagree. Psycho-
analysis has a long history of engagement with radical left politics from
Wilhelm Reich through the Frankfurt School to the Freudian left of the
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1960s and to the Lacanian-inspired psycho-politics of the 1970s and 80s, of
which ÎiÏek is the most prominent example today. Psychoanalysis has an e-
qually strong strain of conservatism and reaction, running all the way back
to Freud, which usually surfaces sooner or later in those radical thinkers
who utilize psychoanalytic ideas. So, for example, the Lacanian position on
gay and lesbian relationships is as bad as any other psychoanalytic school.
As Parker points out, psychoanalysis has a pretty appalling history in rela-
tion to sexual politics and ÎiÏek is no exception here. The
Lacanian/ÎiÏekian position on postmodernity as the decline of the paternal
metaphor is also a conservative lament that we can trace back through the
history of the Freudian left. As Kay puts it, at times ÎiÏek “reads like a
crusty old codger. The left isn’t what it used to be, and the world is going to
the dogs, are his unceasing complaints as he sounds off at the political apa-
thy and moral self-righteousness of modern Western academics” (148). La-
canian psychoanalysis unquestionably played an important political role in
the 1970s and 80s, especially through the work of Lacanian feminists, but
today, as the Lacanian school retreats into “orthodoxy,” its radicalism is in-
creasingly suspect. It is perhaps worth recalling here Lacan’s own view of
revolutionary politics made to the students of Vincennes in 1968: “I would
tell you that the aspiration to revolution has but one conceivable issue, the
discourse of the master. That is what experience has proved. What you, as
revolutionaries, aspire to is a Master. You will have one” (Television 126).
With such views as these, the possibility of radical politics emanating from
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